Bringing it Together: Euthyphro and Serial Killers Saturday, April 26, 2008 at 3:14 pm
We live in a world of incomplete knowledge. In fact, it is actually impossible to attain complete knowledge – if you don’t believe me, ask Gödel, or even worse, ask Heisenberg. This doesn’t mean that some things cannot be proven – it can be proven, for example, that the world is round, or that the sun burns by hydrogen fusion, or that you are looking at a computer screen or fancy-schmancy cell phone screen while reading this. But it does mean that there are some things which cannot be proven, and others which we do not have the capacity to determine with certainty. We make sense of this part of the world (which is much of it) by determining probabilistically what is most likely to be true: it is likely, for instance, that Hilary (Rodham) Clinton is a democratic candidate for president who will not have sufficient delegates to win her party’s nomination, while it is unlikely that she is a secret service agent from Jupiter’s moon Io with the capacity to time-travel and, thus, win the democratic nomination and enslave humanity to the Ionians (that is, citizens of Io, not of a chain of islands off the coast of Greece). And it is likely that the sun is out today because the earth has rotated so that the ground I am standing on is struck by its rays, and unlikely that I am imagining it and that the entire phenomenon of “sun” is unique only to me.
When it comes to matters of religion, we also have incomplete knowledge. There are many holy books, all of them containing what appear to be errors and mistakes, all of them with defenders pointing out that these aren’t really errors or mistakes. Muslims, Christians, Orthodox Jews, and adherents of every religion (and even adherents of no religion) all feel at times a euphoric connectedness to the divine, and offer this as proof of their claims. All have histories that are dark at times, brilliant at others. All have intellectual men and women throughout time who have defended them. As to the existence even of God, there is no mechanism he has left us by which to test and see his existence, and he does not make himself physically manifest to each individual being. So when it comes to claims concerning religion, we are left to determine, according to some set of metrics for truthfulness, what seems most likely among a wide number of possibilities.
Let us suppose that there is a God who desires to and does communicate with men and women in the world, and we want to determine which of the competing claims about God is true. This is where Euthyphro’s dilemma comes in. If morality is what it is, and is acknowledged by God, then we may leverage the moral claims of the various religions and systems of philosophical thought to determine which is most likely to be true. If, on the other hand, morality is determined only by what God “likes”, or happens to choose, then moral claims (possibly the most important ramification of a religion) are irrelevant in our search for religious truth.
Consider the following scenario: It is the evening of September 10, 2001. You are speaking to what you once thought was a very nice middle-eastern man but who has now you tied up in his apartment because you came over to borrow some sugar at the wrong time and intruded on an argument between him and his friends about what was happening tomorrow and who was going to drive to the airport. In trying to dissuade him from what he is about to do, you plead with him, saying, “But would God really want you to kill so many people – children visiting their parents, those who are Muslims themselves with loved ones even in your home country?”
“Do not question the will of Allah!” he replies. “It is his will that the infidels be brought to repentance or be destroyed. They have already failed to come to repentance by wallowing in this country’s greed and rebellion to the will of Allah which is given in the Holy Quran.”
“But would Allah really want you to murder?” you say. “Is he so vindictive to want you to kill? Are you sure you are understanding him right? Is this who God is, so evil?”
“Allah is not evil. What he says is right because the will of Allah is always right.”
Do you see how futile it is to reason about God if it is only God’s might that creates morality? It is impossible to determine between one system of belief about God versus another except through factual accuracy – and as I already noted (all too briefly), all systems I know of have some explaining to do, all being radically placed in that area of the world in which our knowledge is woefully incomplete. If might makes right, it is impossible for a Christian to stake Jesus’ divinity on the quality of his character, and likewise impossible to impugn other systems for the character of their god(s). A priori, fundamentalist Islam is just as valid an option as any form of Christianity. Reverse the above situation: assume that you are the terrorist, raised in a background of fundamentalist Islam, saturated with it, and someone is trying to reason with you. Assuming Allah’s will is all that makes an act right or wrong, there is no way for you to leave your beliefs for moral reasons, for there is no such thing as moral reasons to consider. And so I think that, in order for human beings to able to determine to any degree who God is in a world of incomplete knowledge, morality must be at least to some extent determinable apart from God. This does not necessarily mean that all of morality must be determinable by human means (this is part of the problem of incomplete knowledge), but some of it must be.
Consider another scenario: I wrote about a show I’ve been watching about a serial killer who kills other killers. If morality is determined by what God chooses, then this serial killer is not by his nature any more or less moral than God himself, just less powerful. In fact, in a strict interpretation of double predestination Calvinism, this serial killer may actually be more benevolent than God – choosing his victims based on their own benevolence or malevolence (and thus promoting benevolence), whereas God chooses his victims and friends based on no criterion at all concerning the individual at stake (thus promoting… what?). That’s not to say there aren’t Calvinistic answers to this charge (though I personally find them weak), but it is to say that in defining moral rightness strictly as what God chooses, we can rapidly end up with a human being – even a disturbing or morally ambiguous one – having greater benevolence toward humanity than God! (Necessarily, this means that benevolence is divorced from morality.) This is particularly true if, alongside double predestination, we take a punitive view of hell.
All this is to say, in order to know about God when we ourselves live in a world of incomplete and imperfect knowledge, and in order to know about a God who is good to humanity, I believe the answer to Euthyphro’s dilemma must be that God loves that which is holy because it is holy. But I hold that this does not necessarily mean that humanity always has the capacity to determine holiness (or moral rightness, I am here using the terms interchangeably) in all cases, and this leaves me with another, subtly different dilemma which I feel inadequate to solve.











